

14 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Science & Technology)

SUBJECT: The Attached Draft

1. I am committed to be at NSA most of the afternoon and, accordingly, will miss your meeting on surfacing. From the Director's statement at the Staff Meeting this morning, I gather that we are in no imminent danger but that the Director wants a stand-by scenario for instantaneous release in event of an emergency.

2. As far as I am concerned, the draft memorandum, which I return, is about as good a practical approach to the problem as is likely to occur to anybody. Obviously when the word gets out that a mach three airplane, obviously costing [redacted] has been developed with confidential funds appropriated to CIA, there is going to be a certain amount of interest from many quarters. I would presume that somebody would have to face a considerable amount of pressure from the Congressional investigation of how come, how the funds were used, what the contracting arrangements were, etc., etc. Personally, I don't see how this can be avoided, certainly not by crediting the development to the Air Force which would only make a Congressional investigation inevitable. If you want me to do anything more, let me know.

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OSD REVIEW COMPLETED  
NRO review(s) completed.

JOHN A. BROSS  
D/DCI/NIPE

NR-1

14 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Knoche

SUBJECT: The Annexed Memorandum

I have sent a copy of the annexed memorandum to Dr. Wheelon. It seems to me generally innocuous with the exception of paragraph 8. Here I think that Gene has the cart before the horse. The objective is not to set up an organization suitable for military contingencies which is adequate for peacetime intelligence requirements. The objective is a peacetime intelligence operation which can be adapted to military contingencies. This is a matter of emphasis but seems to me important. My point perhaps can be met by changing the words "will adequately satisfy peacetime intelligence requirements" to "will fully satisfy etc."

JOHN A. BROSS  
D/DCI/NIPE

**SECRET**

*NRO-1*

18 December 1963

NRO

Ultimate objective -- change two words.

Read ultimate in this context as 1 July 1964.

Interim objectives:

- a. Retain status quo for operations and for Program B.
- b. Add Program E to engage DD/S&T assets in long-range R&D.

"a." above requires bureaucratic series of devices to shore up Program B (improved NRO management).

"b." requires negotiation by DCI.

Action required by DD/S&T -- sell this concept.

Develop management devices.

**SECRET**

Executive Registry
63-9086

9 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: *NO. 11* General Carter

Tuesday afternoon, 10 December at 3:30, I will meet with Dr. McMillan. I understand he has prepared a revision to his October 28th directive to General Greer which he withdrew after his discussion with me a week ago.

I would like yours and Dr. Wheelon's advice as to the position I should take with McMillan. Also the position I should take in a discussion I expect to have with Secretary McNamara enroute from Saigon to Washington.

With respect to CIA's activities, I think it is more important for us to exercise the forward-looking imaginative approach to the future than to concern ourselves too much with operations. Quite naturally we do not wish to lose control of operations but the Executive Board which was set up and met last week seems to be a good step in the right direction in this regard.

What worries me is the fact that we are not moving aggressively enough on a new system that will provide a resolution approaching U-2 resolution in a search system. I know that we have the study of the CORONA system under way but I believe we should be developing some concrete ideas on the next forward step. I think this is CIA's most important role in satellite photography.

IS

JOHN A. McCONE  
Director

cc: Dr. Wheelon

JAM/mfb

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
Orig+L addressee

✓ Icc - Dr. Wheelon

Icc - ER

Icc - DCI #5

Icc - DCI Chrono



TOP SECRET

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

*NRW/*

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF  
DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

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[Redacted]

19 Nov 1973

Honorable John A. McCone  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCone:

Here is a paper that I wrote to represent what I believe to be the present NRO policy. I would like to modify it to match your personal feelings. Please don't staff it quite yet within CIA: I shall send it back to CIA in semi-official form.

The purpose of sending this to you now is to get your opinions on a preliminary basis and to get a first cut at this paper before showing it to my bosses.

Sincerely,

[Redacted]

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NRO

Eugene G. Fubini

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[Redacted] *copy 1-5a-A*

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

25X1 NRO



Please find out  
what status of  
this is - I guess  
DDSDT or NIPÉ have  
it for reply — NRO 25X1



For Release 2004/12/15 : CIA-RDP72R00410R0002001000

Draft

EGFubini/sb/11Nov63

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TALKING PAPER ON THE MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF NRO

It is the policy of the NRO:

(1) To fully exploit CIA reconnaissance capabilities as an integral part of the National Reconnaissance Program, to make use of the technical and managerial staff expertise and other capabilities made available by CIA, and to fully take into account such expertise and capabilities, as well as resources, in the matter of assigning NRO programs to elements or organizations within departments and agencies of the U. S. Government.

(2) To keep the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the appropriate organizational elements of CIA fully informed on the status of NRO programs, projects, and activities.

(3) To maintain a similar relation with appropriate elements of the DoD.

(4) To undertake those NRO reconnaissance programs which are directly responsive to intelligence requirements enunciated by USIB.

(5) To allocate DoD resources and funds to NRO programs commensurate with the priorities such programs deserve when weighed against the resources and funds required to meet other national security requirements.

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(6) To fully discuss with the appropriate officials of the CIA, and to obtain the agreement of SecDef and DCI before initiating feasibility and other developmental studies in the reconnaissance field so as to be ready

to exploit new technologies and technological break-throughs for national reconnaissance purposes. The time for initial development to operational capabilities is such that decisions to translate promising developmental studies into developmental programs must of course be made two to three years in advance of the date on which an operational reconnaissance capability is desired.

(7) To make available as required existing DoD resources and capabilities for national reconnaissance purposes, so as to avoid duplication of such capabilities in or by other Government departments or agencies. These capabilities include both the developmental expertise of the Services and the operational capabilities of the units assigned to unified and specified commanders.

(8) To continually seek organizational and management arrangements for national security activities, including reconnaissance operations, that will require no reassignment, and be essentially unchanged in the event of hostilities or international crisis situations or military contingencies, but which -- at the same time -- will adequately satisfy peacetime intelligence requirements.

(9) To fully implement the intent and spirit of the 13 March 1963 CIA-DoD NRO agreement, which was written in conjunction with CIA representatives to reflect the specific organizational and management requirements which were considered essential at that time by the principals, including the DCI, and to utilize that agreement as the basic operating document for prosecution of the NRP.

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11 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. On Monday afternoon, 9 September, at Dr. McMillan's request I met with him in his office in the Pentagon.

2. He had been on leave and wanted to discuss a number of NRO matters that had arisen during his absence.

3. He discussed the interchange of messages between Ledford and Greer as regards the new camera development and their apparent inability to agree on what they had agreed upon. Dr. McMillan was upset about this because he had thought an agreement would be simple. He did not indicate what action he was going to take nor did he ask me to take any action.

4. Dr. McMillan was concerned about the concept of a single manager for all programs involving Kelly Johnson. He was not sure that Kelly would accept such an idea nor that we could put our hands on the proper person to be such a contact. I expressed the same concern and said that Mr. McCone was meeting with Kelly Johnson on Thursday, 12 September, and would sound him out on the proposition.

5. Dr. McMillan then said he was seeking an appointment with Mr. McCone to cover the following:

- a. To report the present status of actions as a result of the Purcell Panel;
- b. To arrange for an NRO budget briefing for Mr. McCone;
- c. To explain to Mr. McCone his idea that there really had not been a scheduling slippage but that an additional satellite had been put into the system which appeared to make the others slip.

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- 2 -

d. Dr. McMillan is going to request membership on USIB. I pointed out that I personally did not consider this appropriate but that I felt that whenever NRO matters were discussed, to include the establishment of requirements, he should certainly be present. I saw little point in his attempting to engage in discussions, without benefit of staff support, in all the other facets of intelligence community work.

e. Dr. McMillan will discuss with Mr. McCone what he intends to say about NRO to the President's Board in response to their memorandum of 7 June to the Secretary of Defense. In this connection, Dr. McMillan said the memorandum to the Secretary of Defense had been routed to DIA and that it was only a day or so ago that he was aware of it or that any action was started on it.

f. I confirmed to Dr. McMillan that Mr. McCone had informed Mr. Gilpatric that if the DOD portions of the NRO were to continue to be handled as a line organization, Mr. McCone would interpose no objection. However, it was Mr. McCone's position that Program B was a CIA program and that Dr. Wheeler, General Carter, and Mr. McCone would all be kept thoroughly witting of everything that went on and that therefore in this connection the line organization ceased. This should not discourage Dr. McMillan from dealing directly with Ledford but he should be aware that his directives might be subject to CIA guidance and override if such seemed appropriate.

g. As to TAGBOARD, I stated that our position was unequivocal and unalterable -- we would welcome a Project Director furnished by Dr. McMillan, but that technical direction and management of the program must remain in Program B under CIA guidance and control. I pointed out that in the present state of other reconnaissance programs we could not do otherwise.

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Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Director

Copy 1 - DCI      Copy 2 - DDCI      Copy 3 - Executive Director  
Copy 4 - DD/S&T      Copy 5 - AD/OSA      Copy 6 - ER